America's political response to the Great Recession was surprising to pundits, but mostly consistent with patterns familiar to political scientists. Ordinary citizens assessed politicians and policies primarily on the basis of visible evidence of success or failure. Thus, in 2008, the president's party was punished at the polls for the dismal state of the election-year economy. The successful challenger, Barack Obama, pushed policy significantly to the left, as Democratic presidents typically do, provoking a predictable "thermostatic" shift to the right in the public's policy mood. In 2010, slow economic recovery and public qualms about ideological overreach exacerbated the losses normally suffered by a president's party in midterm elections. In 2012, Obama was reelected-as incumbents almost always are when their party has held the White House for just four years-thanks in part to a modest but timely upturn in the income growth rate.
ideological manifestos and economic theories, and skeptical of assertions about which parties "historically have delivered for them." They are much more attentive to ends than to means, and they tend to reward or punish incumbent governments based on simple assessments of immediate success or failure. Recognizing these facts makes the political response to the Great Recession-in the U.S. and elsewhere-a good deal less perplexing than it would otherwise be.
Over the past five years, dozens of incumbent governments around the world have faced their voters under conditions of varying economic distress. The results of these elections show little evidence of any consistent shift in favor of either left-wing or right-wing parties in response to the Great Recession. While left-of-center governments (in Portugal, New Zealand, Britain, Spain, and Slovenia) suffered significant losses, so did right-of-center governments (in Iceland, Japan, and Greece)-and centrist coalitions (in the Netherlands, Austria, Germany, and Finland) fared even worse. 3 The most consistent pattern in these election results is that voters have simply, and even simplemindedly, punished incumbents of every stripe for economic hard times. slowed. 4 The magnitude of these rewards and punishments was substantial, with differences in expected vote shares of 24 percentage points over the observed range of GDP growth. Of course, there is much more to elections than economic voting. In
Hungary in 2010 and Ireland in 2011, for example, hard times were compounded by major political scandals. Nevertheless, it is clear that elections in the Great Recession era have been significantly shaped by voters' consistent inclination to reward or punish incumbent governments based on economic growth rates in the months leading up to an election (Bartels 2012c ).
*** Figure 1 ***
My aim here is to provide an overview of American politics since the beginning of the Great Recession, focusing primarily on public opinion and electoral politics, but also touching more superficially upon the political causes and consequences of significant shifts in public policy. In each of these realms, I will argue, Americans responded to the extraordinary circumstances of the Great Recession in ways that were, for the most part, quite ordinary. While this interpretation of recent political history may be surprising in light of the magnitude of the economic crisis-and perhaps even disillusioning to those with a romantic view of American democracy and its capacity for epic moments-it has the virtue of accounting parsimoniously for much that would otherwise be perplexing in the political experience of the past five years.
4 Voters seem to have been mostly focused on economic conditions in the immediate run-up to each election rather than on the incumbent government's overall economic performance; the measure of "weighted GDP growth" employed in Figure 1 attaches almost twice as much weight to growth in the year just before the election as to growth in the preceding year-and no weight at all to growth earlier in the incumbents' tenure. Moreover, there is no evidence that voters made any allowance for the impact of global economic forces by comparing their own economy's performance with that of similar economies elsewhere; election outcomes are more closely related to unadjusted national GDP growth rates than to variously defined relative growth rates.
The 2008 Election and "The New New Deal"
The historic election of Barack Obama in 2008 was consistent both with the global pattern of electoral responses to the Great Recession and with familiar American electoral patterns. While liberal pundits viewed Obama's victory as the dawning of "The New Liberal Order" (Beinart 2008) and "the culmination of a Democratic realignment that began in the 1990s" (Judis 2008) , sober analysis suggests that the election result was very much in keeping with the usual response of electorates to short-term economic distress. In that sense, Obama's presidency itself ranks as the most important political effect of the Great Recession.
The impact of economic conditions on election outcomes has been the focus of a great deal of scholarship over the past half-century. Presidential election outcomes, in particular, have been subjected to scores of statistical analyses which differ in detail, but consistently demonstrate a strong relationship between economic conditions and the incumbent party's success at the polls. Consider, for example, the following very simple regression analysis: 6 The adjusted R-squared statistic is .77, and the standard error of the regression is 5.10. The standard errors of the regression parameter estimates are 2.46, 0.92, and 0.29, respectively; thus, they are easily "statistically significant" by conventional standards.
with the usual historical pattern. McCain trailed Obama in the popular vote by 7.3 percentage points-slightly better than expected, given the dismally low −0.8% midyear income growth rate (which translates into a tenure-adjusted income growth rate of −2.1). Tracing upward along the summary line in Figure 2 suggests an interesting might-have-been: if mid-year income growth in 2008 had been just +0.6%-a rate still well below the historical average of 1.4%-Obama would probably not have been elected. Ironically, the new president owed his presidency to the Great Recession he would spend most of his first term (at least) struggling to overcome.
It is worth underlining that the economic data employed in the analysis summarized in Figure 2 come from the second and third quarters of the election year, before the acute financial crisis symbolized by the collapse of Lehman Brothers in midSeptember could have had much effect on income growth. Thus, the close correspondence between the 2008 outcome and the historical pattern of presidential election results reinforces the notion that, "For ordinary Americans, the Wall Street meltdown was not a turning point, but rather one more sign of the dire condition of the economy and the failure of the Bush Administration's policies" (Abramowitz 2009 ).
Remarkably, even in the midst of an historic economic crisis, voters' economic concerns in 2008 seem to have been more focused on the past and present than on the future. The American National Election Studies survey conducted between Labor Day and Election Day found 90% of the public saying that the national economy had gotten worse over the past year, but only 30% predicting that it would get worse over the coming year-while 27% expected it to get better. Scholars of American voting behavior were pointing out within days of Obama's victory that, from an electoral standpoint, nothing very unusual had happened-and that pundit-talk of realignment was "much-overblown" (Bartels 2008b; Sides 2008 In all of these cases, the ambitiousness of the administration's policy initiatives was tempered by strong opposition from Republicans-and by significant hesitation among some Democrats-in Congress. With the filibuster having evolved "from an extraordinary expression into a routine obstructive tactic" (Skocpol 2012, 26) Other major policy initiatives-most notably in the areas of energy and immigration-were stymied by opposition in the Senate. Politicians on both sides of the aisle were well aware that the public's taste for ambitious policy initiatives was limited. While most Democrats in Congress nonetheless supported most or all of Obama's major policy initiatives, the resulting string of significant legislative achievements had a significant political price tag attached-and the bill came due in the 2010 midterm election.
The 2010 Midterm Election
Having punished Republicans for an ongoing recession in 2008, American voters were equally willing to punish Democrats for a slow economic recovery in 2010.
Forecasts employing a variety of economic indicators, poll results, and other political considerations suggested that the incumbent party would probably lose 40 seats in the House. 10 In fact, it turned out to be even worse than that-a net loss of 63 seats, and control of the chamber. making the notion of a repeat any time soon highly unlikely" (Lynch 2010) .
Despite the unpopularity of the Recovery Act, the direct political cost to
Democrats of supporting the package was almost surely more than offset by the indirect political benefit of more robust economic growth. If we accept Blinder and
Zandi's (2010 , Table 7 ) estimates that the stimulus package added 1.3% to real GDP growth in 2009 and 1.9% in 2010, then economic conditions at the time of the midterm election were distinctly more favorable to the incumbent party as a result of the stimulus than they otherwise would have been. The cross-national relationship depicted in Figure 1 suggests that that additional GDP growth probably added two or three percentage points to the aggregate Democratic vote share in 2010. Thus, the net result was probably close to zero in districts where Democratic incumbents supported the stimulus bill, and a significant gain in districts held by Republicans or by Democrats (disproportionately in competitive seats) who did not support the bill.
These calculations suggest that the Recovery Act very likely "paid for itself" even in strictly electoral terms. That was certainly not true of the Affordable Care Act, whose concrete benefits to prospective voters were both distant and uncertain.
Sweeping health care reform had been an aspiration of Democrats for six decades; but, even with a (fleetingly) "filibuster-proof" majority in the Senate, Obama and his allies lacked sufficient political support to do it quickly, cleanly, and in a way that delivered substantial immediate benefits to their constituents. In the end, however, they proved to be sufficiently determined to do it slowly, messily, and in a way that left them economic stimulus had been "mostly wasted," while only 29% said the money had been "mostly well spent" (http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/polls/postpoll_10052010.html). As for the recovery itself, the electoral response was Janus-faced. Voters clearly punished the incumbent party in 2010 for failing to produce a robust recovery, and mostly disapproved of the policies that seemed to be implicated in that failure.
However, unpopular means-most notably, bank bailouts and stimulus spendingprobably staved off an even worse electoral debacle, because they staved off an even worse economic debacle.
The Impact of the Recession on Policy Preferences
Social scientists setting out to examine the impact of economic distress on political attitudes and policy preferences have repeatedly been surprised to find much less than they expected. For example, Kenworthy and Owens (2011) titled a recent review of evidence from four decades of opinion surveys "The Surprisingly Weak Effect of Recessions on Public Opinion." However, the general tenor of their findings was clearly foreshadowed more than three decades earlier in Schlozman and Verba's (1979) booklength study of the political impact of unemployment in the 1970s. Schlozman and Verba (1979, 351) found that "the effects of unemployment are severe but narrowly focused, manifest in ways that are proximate to the joblessness itself. Many of the connections we had originally expected between unemployment and political beliefs and conduct simply were not made." In particular, they found no tendency for unemployment to produce "general disenchantment with American life, wholesale changes in social ideology, or adoption of radical policy positions" (Schlozman and Verba 1979, 349) . Moreover, "the unemployed as a group contributed less significantly to the electoral outcome in 1976 than the common wisdom would have suggested. … Political activity is more a function of beliefs about politics than of specific personal experiences; political beliefs, in turn, are more a function of general social beliefs than of personal experiences. Once again, the severe economic strain of job loss has little direct impact on political life" (Schlozman and Verba 1979, 330, 332 ).
Kenworthy and Owens' broader survey of opinion data over the past four decades suggested that "recent economic recessions have had real but mostly temporary effects on American attitudes on key economic, political, and social issues" (Kenworthy and Owens 2011, 198) . However, they found "no indication of any increase in support for policies that enhance opportunity, support for the poor, or support for redistribution. … Economic downturns, including the Great Recession, have had surprisingly little impact on Americans' views of government, even in the short run" (Kenworthy and Owens 2011, 216-217, 204) .
A narrower but more detailed study by Margalit (2013) Among people who actually became unemployed during this period, Margalit (2013) found a significant increase in support for "funding of government programs for helping the poor and the unemployed with education, training, employment, and social services." Given the explicit mention of "the unemployed" in the question, this effect may be seen as echoing Schlozman and Verba's (1979, 349) finding that unemployment was associated with support for specific "policies designed to ameliorate the situation," though not for "wholesale changes in social ideology."
Moreover, even this narrow effect was of rather modest magnitude: 59% of those who lost their jobs during the course of Margalit's panel study supported increased funding of these programs, as compared with 47% of those who kept their jobs. And even over the course of a severe recession, the number of people who lost their jobs was much too small for this shift in views to make a substantial dent in the overall distribution of public opinion.
Moreover, Margalit's analysis of people who became reemployed over the course of his panel study suggests that the effect of unemployment was quite transitory: only 49% of them supported increased spending on programs for the poor and unemployed-a figure barely higher than among people who remained employed throughout the recession. Republicans were especially likely to become more favorable toward increased spending on programs for the poor and unemployed when they lost their jobs, but also more likely to revert to their former views when they became reemployed. Schlozman and Verba's (1979, 351 ) emphasis on opinion change that is "narrowly focused" and "proximate" rather than broadly ideological also seems to apply to
Americans' views about the specific policy tools employed to address the Great Recession. A summer 2009 BBC World Service Poll measured public support for three of the most salient policy responses to the economic crisis: "giving financial support to banks in trouble," "increasing government regulation and oversight of the national economy," and "significantly increasing government spending to stimulate the economy." None of these programs was particularly popular; the results presented in the first row of Table 1 show that the balance of public opinion was slightly negative in the cases of increasing government regulation and stimulus spending, and strongly negative in the case of support for troubled banks.
*** Table 1 ***
These results underline the political pitfalls facing the Obama administration as it grappled with the Great Recession, especially in the period following the first months of acute economic crisis. Of the six other affluent democracies included in the survey-Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, and the United Kingdom-only
Germany showed a similar lack of public enthusiasm for all three of these policy options.
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In a follow-up survey conducted the following summer, the same pollsters asked about the same three possible government responses to the crisis. Strikingly, the American public's support for all three policies was markedly lower in 2010 than it had been a year earlier. Presumably, these shifts in public opinion reflected the tendency of ordinary Americans to assess policies in terms of apparent success or failure rather than abstract ideology. Having experienced bailouts, bank stress tests, and a seemingly massive stimulus program, and seeing no dramatic improvement in tangible economic conditions as a result, most Americans were in no mood for counterfactual arguments that, in fact, these "comprehensive policy responses saved the economy from another depression" (Blinder and Zandi 2010, 10) . Tellingly, this decline in popular support for the most salient policy responses to the crisis was by no means limited to the U.S.; support for aiding troubled banks and increasing government spending declined from 2009 to 2010 in every one of the six countries included in both surveys.
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The 2010 BBC World Service Poll also included an additional policy option: "taking steps to reduce the government's budget deficit and debt, by cutting some spending or increasing some taxes." That option was distinctly more popular than any of the original three, with 52% of Americans favoring steps to reduce government deficit and debt (28% "strongly") and only 32% opposing (19% "strongly"). When asked which of two possible approaches to deficit reduction their government should "focus on more," the survey respondents overwhelmingly chose "cutting spending on government services, including ones you use" over "increasing taxes" (64% to 23%, the rest choosing neither or both or something else).
It is tempting to interpret this public support for budget-cutting as a reflection of Americans' deep-seated suspicion (at least in the abstract) of big government.
However, the public sentiment in favor of budget-cutting seems to have been widely actually tried it; whether public support for budget-cutting can survive significant cuts in actual spending will probably depend on whether those cuts seem to lead to robust economic growth.
Explaining the Limited Impact of the Recession
If the impact of the Great Recession on political attitudes and policy preferences has been "surprisingly weak," why is that? Four lines of explanation seem promising. Second, the pundits' expectation that Americans would either push or follow their new Democratic president to the political left flew in the face of considerable historical evidence suggesting that the public is much more likely to react against perceived shifts in policy than to reinforce them. For explications of the statistical analysis underlying this measure, see Stimson (1998) and rather little to do with the actual content of policy; some important policy shifts are largely ignored by the public, while modest changes may be inflated by political opponents into harbingers of socialism or social Darwinism. Nevertheless, insofar as the public does respond to actual shifts in the ideological content of public policy, it is likely to be as a restraining force rather than as a propelling force.
Third, the increasing partisan polarization of the American political system over the past three decades (Levendusky 2009 ) has probably decreased the scope for substantial shifts in public preferences, at least on issues central to partisan conflict.
Democrats and Republicans routinely disagree not only about political leaders and policies, but even about such seemingly objective matters as whether unemployment has increased or decreased-and these disagreements are often sharpest among those who are generally well-informed about politics (Bartels 2012b) . 20 Given the complexity of elite policy debates and the ambiguity of available evidence regarding the actual effects of most policies, attention to elite discourse may simply provide partisans on both sides with arguments and "evidence" that bolster their preexisting beliefs.
Even when "experts" come to considerable agreement about how the world works, their views may have little sway over people to whom they speak inconvenient truths.
For example, a 2012 survey of prominent economists found strong agreement 20 Even views about junk food are not immune to partisan biases. In 2011, Herman Cain, the former head of Godfather's Pizza, was a prominent candidate for the Republican presidential nomination. Over the course of the year, a survey tracking public assessments of the company's quality, value, and reputation revealed significant polarization along partisan lines. At the beginning of the year, before Cain's emergence, Republicans and Democrats had identical, slightly positive views of Godfather's Pizza; in November, shortly before Cain dropped out of the presidential race, Republicans had become substantially more favorable, while Democrats had become distinctly unfavorable (Marzilli 2011 Finally, observers who expected Obama to rally the public in support of an ambitious progressive policy response to the economic crisis-or of an even broader progressive agenda unrelated to the crisis-drastically overestimated the ability of this (or any other) president to shape public opinion to suit his political taste.
Much of the criticism from the left of Obama's first-term performance hinged on the belief that, through a "potent combination of insider leadership, mobilization of public opinion, and alliance with social movements on the ground," he should have been able to engineer policy changes comparable in magnitude to those produced by Franklin Roosevelt and Lyndon Johnson (Kuttner 2011) . Skocpol (2012, 44-45) attributed the "endless political controversy and electoral blowback" of Obama's first term primarily to the "incomprehension and anxiety of everyday Americans" faced with bewildering policy debates, and to "a veritable explosion of political pushback" fragmented focus inherently restricted the White House's ability to present a coherent economic plan" (Skocpol 2012, 37-38, 36 ).
Arguments of this sort put undue stock in the power of the "bully pulpit" to sway public opinion-a mythical power that has mostly failed to withstand systematic scholarly scrutiny (Edwards 2003) . They also fail to account for the fact that the most costly "electoral blowback" against the president's congressional allies in 2010 seems not to have come in reaction to his misunderstood economic plan, but in reaction to his ambitious health care reform-the very policy area in which, by Skocpol's (2012, 35) account, "Obama gave major speeches and orchestrated theatrically effective issue forums at key intervals during 2009 and early 2010, displaying presidential leadership and offering framings that proved influential beyond as well as within the Beltway." If this was an example of the "bully pulpit" in action, it is hardly surprising that Democrats in Congress were not eager to stake their careers on further exercises of progressive presidential leadership.
Kuttner's notion that Obama might have advanced a more ambitious progressive policy agenda through "alliance with social movements on the ground" seems even more farfetched. The most visible manifestation of progressive activism in the wake of the Great Recession, the Occupy Wall Street movement, was credited by political journalists with "turning the national conversation towards inequality" (Klein 2011 ).
However, it would be more accurate to say that Occupy Wall Street "impacted the debate in Washington" and the narrative of Obama's own reelection campaign (Berman 2011 ) without making any significant dent on the views of ordinary Americans. However, comparisons with past surveys suggest that the public perception of increasing inequality was actually less broadly shared in 2012 than it had been four years-or even a full decade-earlier.
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Nor is there any evidence of a significant shift in public views regarding the most momentous concrete policy issue addressed (insofar as any concrete policy issue was addressed) by the Occupy Wall Street movement-the fate of the Bush tax cuts. In
October 2012, after more than a year of media attention and an intense presidential campaign, 40% of the public favored President Obama's long-standing proposal to restore the Clinton-era tax rates for households earning more than $250,000 per year (while another 15% favored letting all the Bush tax cuts expire). However, that was slightly less support than Obama's proposal had had two years earlier, at the time of the Republicans' midterm sweep. Indeed, the repeated measures of views about the Bush tax cuts reported in Table 2 Table 3 reports the results of statistical analyses tracking the impact of economic perceptions on vote intentions over the course of the campaign using the same survey data as in Figure 4 , from the 2012 Cooperative Campaign Analysis Project.
For each two-month campaign period, the table shows the estimated impact of economic perceptions-whether respondents thought the economy was getting better or worse-on current vote intentions. Because all of these respondents completed a baseline survey in December 2011, they can be partitioned into three distinct subsets based on their predispositions at the beginning of the 2012 campaign: those who reported supporting Obama in the baseline interview (43%), those who reported supporting Romney (38%), and those who reported being unsure who they would 23 Bartels (2006) provided similar but more fragmentary evidence of the "priming" of economic perceptions over the course of previous presidential campaigns. Vavreck (2009) support (15%). 24 Table 3 reports the results of separate analyses for these three distinct groups.
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*** Table 3 ***
The results for 2011 undecided voters, in the top panel of Table 3 , provide strong evidence of an increasing effect of economic perceptions on vote intentions over the course of the campaign. In the first four months of the election year-roughly, during the competitive phase of the Republican primary campaign-Obama's expected preference share among previously undecided voters who saw the economy as improving was about 15 points higher than among those who thought the economy was getting worse. However, once Romney emerged as the presumptive Republican nominee, the impact of economic perceptions on vote intentions increased markedly, and that impact remained substantially higher through the summer and fall than it had been earlier in the election year. After Labor Day, Obama's expected vote share among previously undecided voters who saw the economy as improving was about 24 points higher than among those who thought the economy was getting worse. 24 My analysis excludes the remaining 4% of the baseline survey respondents, who volunteered that they supported some other candidate. 25 The estimates presented in Table 3 are derived from regression analyses including party identification, ideology, education, income, church attendance, labor union membership, homeownership, sex, race, and Hispanic origin as control variables. Since contemporaneous economic perceptions, party identification, and ideology are measured with error-and since they may be contaminated by shifts in vote intentions stemming from other sources-I employ instrumental variables regression analyses using pre-campaign measures of these variables from the December 2011 baseline wave of the CCAP survey as instruments for the contemporaneous measures. On average, the instrumental variables estimates reported in Table Economic perceptions also seem to have become increasingly consequential over the course of the campaign among prospective voters who reported supporting Romney or Obama in the December 2011 baseline survey. Although most of them stuck by their original vote intentions through the campaign season, those who defected were disproportionately those whose economic perceptions were incongruent with their original vote intentions. And that was increasingly true as the campaign wore on-though the impact of economic perceptions was always more modest for Romney supporters (in the middle panel of Table 3 ) and for Obama supporters (in the bottom panel) than for those who had begun the election year undecided.
If pessimistic perceptions of the economy became increasingly consequential over the course of the 2012 campaign, how is it that Obama nevertheless managed to win reelection? Part of the answer is that prospective voters' perceptions of the economy became significantly less pessimistic in the fall than they had been in the summer-a shift coinciding with the beginning of a rebound in the actual income growth rate in September. The statistical analyses summarized in Table 3 suggest that this upturn in economic perceptions probably boosted Obama's popular vote margin by about a percentage point. 26 Thus, an election held a few months sooner might have been even closer.
What was even more important for Obama, however, was the structural advantage of running as a first-term incumbent. American voters have consistently held 26 The average improvement in economic perceptions between July-August and OctoberNovember was about 12 points. The average impact of economic perceptions implied by the parameter estimates in the last column of Table 3 (each weighted by the proportion of survey respondents in the corresponding baseline preference group) is .072. Multiplying these two quantities produces an estimated increase in Obama's vote share of 0.9 percentage points. A similar calculation comparing the estimated average perceptions on Election Day in Figure 4 with the more pessimistic perceptions three months earlier produces an estimated increase in Obama's vote share of 1.1 percentage points.
incumbent parties to higher standards the longer they have been in power. The summary line in Figure 2 , which shows the expected popular vote margin for first-term incumbents in post-war elections, suggests that any income growth at all is likely to be sufficient for reelection when a party has held the White House for only four years.
Indeed, the only incumbent party candidate in more than a century to have lost in that circumstance was Jimmy Carter, who ran for reelection in the midst of an election-year recession even more severe than the Republicans' in 2008.
As it turned out, the 2012 election outcome was almost precisely consistent with Figure 2 to the left or right, but is unlikely to move it far away from the expected outcome indicated by the summary line. 29 The statistical analysis on which the summary line in Figure 2 is based suggests that four additional years in office would have reduced the Democratic vote margin by 7 percentage points, more than enough to erase Obama's actual margin of 3.8%.
Economic Crises and Political Change: Was the New Deal So Different?
To Theda Skocpol (2012, 44) Were the policy changes championed by Roosevelt really so much more visible and comprehensible-or, for that matter, more popular-than those pursued by Obama? Newman and Jacobs (2010, 15) have suggested that FDR, like Obama, had plenty of disappointed political supporters: "Though we remember Roosevelt today as the man who did more for the poor and dispossessed than any president before, and arguably anyone since, in his own day leftists and labor liberals often complained that Roosevelt's actions were too little, too late, and too tepid." Four years into the New Deal, and a year after Roosevelt's landslide reelection, the editors of The Economist (1937, 147 ) offered just such a tepid appraisal: "Relief there has been, but little more than enough to keep the population fed, clothed and warmed. Recovery there has been, but only to a point still well below the pre-depression level. The great problems of the country are still hardly touched."
Political polarization in the 1930s was less strictly along partisan lines than it is today, but it would be a mistake to jump to the conclusion that it was any less severe.
In a Gallup survey conducted in 1936, at the height of FDR's popularity, Americans were asked, "Do you believe the acts and policies of the Roosevelt Administration may lead to dictatorship?" A remarkable 45% of the respondents-and 83% of
Republicans-said yes (Key 1961, 246) . In the conventional understanding of the electoral politics of the 1930s, the forging of a durable new partisan alignment hinged crucially on popular responses to the policies and personality of FDR. V. O. Key, Jr. (1958, 578-579) claimed that the Democratic landslide of 1936 had "a special significance. … The result could only be interpreted as a popular ratification of the broad features of new public policy." James Sundquist (1983, 214) wrote that voters were "attracted by the Democratic program and the Rooseveltian personality and leadership." Even the authors of The American
Voter, who downplayed the importance of ideology for most voters most of the time, attributed the "profound realignment of party strength" in the 1930s to "the program of welfare legislation of the New Deal and the extraordinary personality of its major exponent, Franklin D. Roosevelt" (Campbell et al. 1960, 534) .
In fact, though, Roosevelt's political fate was probably just as dependent as
Obama's has been on voters' assessments of immediate economic progress.
Christopher Achen and I (Achen and Bartels 2005) In other democracies around the world, voters in the depths of the Great Depression showed a notable willingness to replace incumbents of every ideological stripe with an equally diverse range of alternatives, including conservatives, socialists, Irish nationalists, Nazis, and (in the Canadian prairie province of Alberta) a radio preacher running on a platform of distributing free money. As David Mayhew (2002, 161 ) put it, "academics have tended to dismiss campaign slogans of the past like 'the full dinner pail' and 'a chicken in every pot' on the grounds that something deeper must have been going on in these elections. But perhaps it wasn't."
The dramatic recovery of the American economy over the course of Roosevelt's presidency did produce a gradual but substantial shift in partisan loyalties-as did the parallel recoveries in many other places around the world (Achen and Bartels 2005; . If the Great Recession turns out to produce any similar shift in the balance of partisan loyalties, it will significantly affect American politics for a long time to come. Liberal Order" turned out to be premature, the Democrats' midterm "shellacking" was interpreted-and not only by John Boehner-as an "unmistakable message" to "change course," significantly altering the subsequent political standing and strategies of both the president and his Republican opponents. Nevertheless, the day after Obama won reelection by a narrow margin-precisely in keeping with historical precedent-one enthusiastic commentator declared it "an inflection point in American political history" (Creamer 2012 ).
When interpretations of this sort are mistaken-as they often are-political trouble may ensue. The truth of the matter is that ideological mandates are exceedingly rare in American politics, even in times of economic crisis. Indeed, what may be most striking about the politics of the Great Recession is how ordinary they look. In bad times, as in good times, ordinary citizens have a stubborn tendency to judge politicians and policies not on the basis of ideology or economic doctrine, but of perceived success or failure. Jan.-Feb.
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Undecided in December 2011
Economic trend worse/same/better (−100/0/+100)
.073 (.031) .068 (.036) .241 (.034) .179 (.040) .120
(.036) 
Romney Supporters in December 2011
Economic trend better/same/worse (−100/0/+100)
.013 (.007) .049 (.010) .059 (.012) .084 (.013) .077
(.013) 
Obama Supporters in December 2011
Economic trend better/same/worse (−100/0/+100) .019 (.005) .030 (.006) .035 (.008) .038 (.009) .050
(.009) 
